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When the global financial  crisis  hit the shores of Europe, after crossing the Atlantic, the 
Eurozone  was  considered  a  safe  haven.  After  the  first  Greek  bailout  in  May  2010,  the 
discourse had now changed completely; the debt crisis was the euro’s fault. As a result, some 
argued that Greece and eventually other bailed-out member states should abandon the euro 
and reintroduce their national currencies. If they did not, then countries such as Germany and 
the Netherlands would give up on supporting them financially, forcing them to abandon the 
euro anyway. Yet, no such thing has happened. The euro and the European Union are still 
with us. In fact, European integration has been deepened as a result of the debt crisis. This 
paper explains why the doomsayers have been wrong on durability of the Eurozone. 
 
Mots clés : Debt crisis, Euro, European integration, European Monetary 
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Introduction 
 
When the global financial crisis hit the shores of Europe, after crossing the Atlantic, the 
Eurozone was considered a safe haven (Jones, 2009; Wyplosz, 2009). Although there were 
concerns  about  how  the  euro  would  face  up  to  its  first  major  crisis  (Feldstein,  2008; 
Münchau, 2009), the European Union‘s (EU) single currency was generally viewed as a 
protective force against the financial storm shaking the world. For instance, The Economist 
concluded that ‗the Euro has proved a haven in the economic crisis—so much so that no 
country seriously wants to leave it and plenty want to join‘ (The Economist, 2009). Such a 
view was also shared by sovereign bond investors since, according to Attinasi et al. (2010a, 
p. 35), there was a ‗flight to safety‘ towards the Eurozone between September 2008 (when 
Lehman  Brothers  failed)  and  March  2009  (when  financial  markets  began  to  stabilize). 
During that period, most Eurozone countries saw their sovereign bond yields decline. 
 
By the spring of 2010, when the Greek debt crisis reached its (first) apex, the discourse had 
changed  completely.  The  euro  was  now  blamed  for  the  debt  crisis  propagating  itself 
through the so-called ‗PIIGS‘ (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain) and requiring the 
financial intervention of the EU and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It is the euro‘s 
same protective shield that was now declared at fault because it allowed Member States 
such as Greece to indulge in a feast of fiscal deficits. Increasingly, the Eurozone came to be 
seen  as  something  unsustainable,  which  is  exemplified  by  Financial  Times  columnist 
Gideon Rachman‘s conclusion: ‗Increasingly the Euro looks less like an indissoluble union, 
and more and more like an unhappy marriage between incompatible partners‘ (Rachman,   2 
2010). Presumably, the end of the Eurozone and the EU would unfold like this: the domino 
effect that has already hit Greece, Ireland and Portugal would reach Italy and Spain; some 
Member States would eventually be forced to default; ultimately Germany and its northern 
neighbours  would  dump  their  southern  EU  partners  and  form  a  new,  more  stable  and 
prosperous union. 
 
More than one year after the first Greek bailout, the EU and the Eurozone are still intact. In 
fact, there is now more integration of fiscal affairs in the EU and the Eurozone than there 
was back in the spring of 2010. For instance, the Eurozone has now created what is for all 
intents and purposes a European monetary fund, something that was considered impossible 
only a few years back. In fact, those who saw the Eurozone as a safe haven at the beginning 
of the global financial crisis were right to do so. Things would surely have been worse for 
countries like Greece, Ireland and Portugal if they had been outside the euro to deal with 
their plight. Furthermore, the major complaint  so far amongst pundits is that Eurozone 
leaders have not done enough to quell the crisis, meaning that there should be more Europe, 
not  less. The two most common solutions  invoked are a common Eurobond and more 
money for the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and its future replacement, the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM).  
 
So,  how  do  we  explain  the  Eurozone‘s  (and  the  EU‘s)  resilience?  Why  have  the 
doomsayers proved wrong? Given that at the time of writing, the European debt crisis was 
still in full swing, pessimists might say that it was still only a question of time before the 
euro falls into the abyss. However, nothing indicates that any Eurozone Member State has   3 
the intention to give up  the integrity of the euro. On the contrary, with every new instance 
of financial market pressure (or panic), Eurozone leaders come together to calm things 
down, even if they often only manage to do so for a while. The process might not be pretty 
but politics rarely is.
1 Nevertheless, the end result has al ways been to find a European 
solution and push integration forward. 
 
This chapter argues that there are two reasons why the Eurozone did not implode as a result 
of the debt crisis. First, although economically and politically painful, bailing out Greece, 
Ireland and Portugal (and maybe even Italy and Spain), putting in place a temporary EFSF 
that will be replaced by a permanent ESM in 2013, cutting down fiscal deficits and public 
debts,  undertaking  market -liberalizing  reforms  as  well  as  reforming  the Stabil ity  and 
Growth Pact (SGP) all represent a better policy option than the alternative of a euro (and 
EU) failure. Second, in spite of its weaknesses, the euro has so far been a tremendous 
political and economic success. The doomsayers‘ scenario would mean throwing away all 
these  accomplishments,  not  to  mention  the  probable  end  of  the  EU  itself.  In  sum,  the 
Eurozone debt crisis has been an opportunity for more EU, not less. This means that the 
European integration project will continue to move forward, with the Member States in the 
lead and European institutions in a supporting role. If regional economic integration is seen 
as generally beneficial to countries, then it seems logical to conclude that it is better to be 
one for all and all for one than to be none for all and all for none. 
 
                                                 
1 In comparison, the politics of the United States debt crisis makes European leaders look very reasonable and 
clear-headed.   4 
The end is nigh: the doomsayers’ reasoning 
Although  some  concerns  were  initially  expressed  with  regards  to  the  euro‘s  ability  to 
withstand the global financial crisis, it is not until the Greek debt crisis got going in late 
2009 that the doomsayers‘ arguments about the euro and its future (and by extension the 
EU), gained credence in the media and the public. Their reasoning is based primarily on the 
idea that the euro, because of its inherent flaws, is responsible for the debt crisis. However, 
it is also predicated on the expectation that Greece will eventually default on its debt and, 
through contagion in financial markets, force other Mediterranean countries to do the same. 
In such a scenario, these countries would have to leave the Eurozone and possibly the EU. 
Should the euro continue to exist, it would do so with only a few countries concentrated 
around a Franco-German core. 
 
Critics who blame the euro for the debt crisis in Europe rest their argument on the fact that, 
when they adopted the single currency, Euro-Med countries like Greece, Italy and Spain 
could no longer devalue their currencies in order to maintain their competitiveness vis-à-vis 
their Eurozone partners, as they had done in the past.
2 Consequently, the only way for these 
countries  to  improve  their  economies‘  competitiveness  was  by  undertaking  labour  and 
product  market  reforms  that  would  improve  productivity  and  reduce  relative  prices. 
Unfortunately, that is not what happened. They took advantage of the lower interest rates 
that joining the Eurozone offered them as well as the general good health of the European 
                                                 
2 Ireland‘s situation is different from that of the Euro-Med countries since its fiscal problems arise solely from 
the failure of its banking system, which was bailed out with public funds. It should also be mentioned that 
Spain‘s fiscal difficulties also stem in good part from failures in its banking system, which like Ireland also 
arose because of a collapse in the real estate market. For more information on the housing booms experienced 
by Ireland and Spain, see Hibers et al. (2008).   5 
economy to avoid making the necessary reforms. Governments also continued to run fiscal 
deficits, which sometimes ran afoul of the SGP rules (that is, a maximum deficit of 3% of 
GDP). However, overall public debt did not necessarily increase since economic growth 
was strong. A lot of private investment and consumption, which contributed to fueling 
growth, were financed with indebtedness rather than savings, since credit was cheap and 
abundant.  The  end  result  was  that  prices  and  wages  increased  without  productivity 
following  suit.  Because  governments  could  no  longer  devalue  their  currencies,  their 
economy‘s  goods  became less and less competitive internationally while foreign  goods 
became relatively cheaper. Thus, the current account surpluses that these countries were 
running  before  joining  the  euro  turned  into  significant  deficits,  which  mean  that  the 
economies were now consuming more than they were producing. Current account deficits 
are  financed  by  (often  foreign)  investors,  who  buy  financial  securities  issued  by 
governments (sovereign bonds) and corporations (shares and bonds). In the case of the 
Euro-Med countries, the Germans and their northern European neighbours, through banks 
and other financial institutions, were the ones that provided most of the financing. This is 
because northern European countries were running current account surpluses that needed 
investing  abroad.  Germans  in  particular  had  done  what  the  Greeks,  the  Italians,  the 
Portuguese,  the  Spaniards  and  even  the  Irish  should  have  done:  they  increased  their 
economy‘s  international  competitiveness  by  keeping  wage  rises  low  and  improving 
productivity  while  maintaining  their  relatively  high  savings  rate  to  finance  investment 
domestically.  This  allowed  them  to  produce  large  current  account  surpluses  that  were 
invested in southern and eastern EU partners.
3 
                                                 
3 The situation in central and Eastern Europe was no different in general, which is why many of them have   6 
 
Although one could argue that the above-mentioned situation was ultimately allowed to 
arise  because  Euro-Med  governments  adopted  national  economic  policies  that  were 
inadequate in the context of a common currency, the European monetary union itself was 
not inconsequential. At the heart of the matter is the fact that the Eurozone is (still) not an 
optimal currency area (OCA). An OCA is deemed to exist if its members (countries or sub-
national regions) possess at least one of three characteristics. First, they must face similar 
shocks  to  their  economies  and  react  to  these  shocks  in  the  same  way.  Second,  in  the 
absence of such symmetry, an OCA occurs if the Member States have sufficient labour and 
capital mobility between them so that factors of production can move from one country 
experiencing  an  economic  downturn  to  another  enjoying  an  upturn.  Finally,  if  both 
symmetry and factors of production mobility are inexistent, then an OCA exists if there is a 
high level of price flexibility (especially wages) in member states.
4 The reason why these 
OCA criteria are important is because in a monetary union mem ber states have effectively 
relinquished control over their national monetary policy.
5 Therefore, the common monetary 
policy may not be well adapted to all or any of the member states‘ economic situation. 
 
In the Economic  and Monetary Union‘s  case, Member  States  have delegated monetary 
policy to the European Central Bank (ECB). Because the Eurozone is not an OCA, the 
ECB‘s monetary policy contributed to fueling the imbalances between the north and the 
                                                                                                                                                     
required financial assistance from the EU and the IMF. For details, see ECB (2010). 
4 For details on OCA theory and its evolution, see Kenen and Meade (2008). 
5 This is the famous trilemma identified by Robert Mundell (1963) and Marcus Fleming (1962), whereby no 
country can have simultaneously the following three things: internationally mobile capital, fixed exchange 
rates and an autonomous monetary policy. They can only two of those three elements at once. For details, see 
Obstfeld et al. (2005).   7 
south that developed after the euro‘s inception. In fact, as Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) 
concluded more than a decade ago, the Eurozone is constituted of two core OCAs, one 
centered on France and Germany (with Austria, the Benelux countries and Slovenia) and 
another involving southern European countries. Contrary to what Frankel and Rose (1998) 
argued, an OCA for the Eurozone did not arise endogenously following the introduction of 
the single currency (Willett et al., 2010). Thus, given that the ECB‘s monetary policy is 
targeted to the entire Eurozone rather than specific countries and given that the Franco-
German  core  is  the  most  significant  part  of  the  Eurozone  economy,  then  the  common 
monetary policy was better suited to the economic situation of northern countries rather 
than the Euro-Med ones. For instance, between 2001 and 2005 the German economy pretty 
much stagnated, with an average annual real GDP growth rate of less than 0.5 per cent. At 
the same time, Greece, Ireland and Spain were experiencing rates of growth above three per 
cent of GDP. Hence, for them the Eurozone‘s monetary policy should have been much 
stricter than it actually was. Interest rates should have been much higher in order slow 
down growth and inflation, which was running at over three per cent annually, compared to 
less than two per cent in Germany.
6 Thus, the ECB‘s monetary policy was inadequate to 
deal with growth disparities between Eurozone members. 
 
The only option left for countries facing inflationary pressures and a common monetary 
policy that is too loose is to use fiscal policy to cool the economy down. However, this is 
politically  difficult  to  justify:  how  can  a  government  raise  taxes  and  decrease  public 
spending when the economy is booming, especially if public debt is itself declining? In 
                                                 
6 Real GDP growth and inflation data are from Eurostat.   8 
fact,  Ireland  and  Spain  were  already  running  budget  surpluses  during  that  period.  
Nevertheless,  they  should  technically  have  done  more.  The  Greek  case  is  the  most 
conspicuous since fiscal deficits were averaging five per cent of GDP at a time when the 
economy was booming. Clearly, the government was adding fuel on the fire when it should 
have been trying to put it out, which explains why Greece‘s public finances exploded when 
the  global  financial  crisis  hit.  In  a  way,  the  Greek  situation  is  one  that  the  SGP  was 
supposed to prevent but did not, although the fact that Greece underreported its public 
finance statistics made it more difficult to undertake the right procedures at the right time.
7 
Nonetheless, the SGP‘s main weakness has always been that it is politically difficult to 
enforce (Heipertz and Verdun, 2010), which is why financial markets were counted on to 
exercise  the  necessary  pressures  on  governments  whose  finances  were  not  sustainable 
(Leblond, 2006). It is not until early 2009 – when the global financial crisis had reached its 
apex – that sovereign bond yield spreads and credit-default swap premiums began to reflect 
the diverging states of Eurozone members‘ public finances.
8 Until then, sovereign bond 
investors were happy to treat Eurozone countries as a single bond market (Pagano and von 
Thadden, 2004).  
 
Increasingly, investors began to worry that sovereign debt in Greece, Ireland and Portugal 
was growing too rapidly and to levels that would become unsustainable in the absence of 
some major reforms to reverse the trend. The only way to stabilize government debt, if not 
                                                 
7 The poor quality of Greek government finance statistics was already in the public domain in 2004 (Eurostat, 
2004).  
8 For studies analysing the determinants of bond yield spreads in Europe, especially during the crisis, see 
Attinasi et al. (2010b), Barrios et al. (2009), Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009), and Sgherri and Zoli (2009).    9 
to reduce it, is to restore fiscal balance between revenues and expenditures. This requires 
cutting down government spending and raising revenues through higher taxes, a larger tax 
base and/or enhanced economic growth. This is very difficult to do in the context of a deep 
recession. In fact, the latter was one of the main reasons why fiscal deficits were booming 
in the Eurozone: in an economic slowdown, tax revenues normally decrease as a result of 
lower economic activity while social expenditures increase as there are more people who 
are unemployed and, thus, require some form of financial assistance. If one adds the need 
for the government to bailout banks in particular and the financial system in general in 
order to prevent the recession from turning into a depression, as in Ireland and Spain, then 
the mix becomes an explosive cocktail for public debt. 
 
This is why it was extremely difficult for governments in the PIIGS to begin restoring fiscal 
balance before the crisis had passed and economic growth had resumed. The problem is 
that investors understood this predicament as well. So the longer the crisis lasted and the 
more governments‘ debt increased, the more investors became worried. As a result, yields 
on sovereign bond ultimately reached a point where they became a self-fulfilling prophecy; 
that is, the returns demanded by investors to cover the heightened risk of default ended up 
reaching levels that made servicing the debt unsustainable when it came to refinancing.
9  
 
This is when EU-IMF bailouts became necessary, because they provided governments with 
an alternative source of financing that is cheaper than what financial markets offered. That 
                                                 
9 Self-fulfilling behaviour by financial market participants is a common feature of financial crises 
(Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005).     10 
way, default could actually be avoided. Such financial assistance, however, needs to be 
accompanied by a credible and rigorous adjustment programme to reduce fiscal deficits and 
restructure the economy to make it grow faster in the future. As such, public bailouts buy a 
government time to effectively put in place the required fiscal and economic reforms that 
will bring the economy back on the path of lasting prosperity, which in return will allow it 
to finance public debt privately once again. 
 
The doomsayers‘ view of such a situation is that the level of commitment by both parties to 
the  bailouts  is  insufficient.  On  the  side  of  the  countries  receiving  financial  assistance, 
governments in Greece, Ireland and Portugal will not have the staying power to impose in 
full the fiscal and economic adjustments to bring back the public debt to a sustainable level. 
The domestic political  pressures  from the  general  population  as  well as  vested interest 
groups  will  become  so  intense  that  the  government  (or  its  replacement,  following  an 
election) will either water down the reforms in order to spread the adjustment over a longer 
period or abandon them altogether. In the latter case, it means that the government would 
default on its debt and leave the euro. In the former case, it implies that the bailouts have to 
last for longer than originally anticipated. The problem here, according to the doomsayers, 
is that governments in financially-solid Germany, France and the Netherlands, which are 
the ultimate guarantors of the bailouts, will not want to continue providing ‗profligate‘ 
Member States with financial aid if the necessary fiscal and structural reforms are not put 
into place effectively. This is because the domestic political pressure against supporting 
Euro-Med  ‗laziness‘  with  ‗hard-earned‘  northern  savings  would  eventually  become  too   11 
strong  to  overcome  unless  there  is  clear  evidence  that  bailout  recipients  are  actually 
imposing the required austerity on themselves. 
 
Basically, the doomsayers believe that the politics of austerity in the Eurozone are not 
sustainable: either bailed-out countries default and leave the euro on their own (because 
they cannot sustain the necessary austerity) or they are forced to default and leave the euro 
because Germany & co. will no longer willing to stand by them as they restructure their 
economy and public finances. As such, they share with sovereign bond investors the same 
lack of confidence in the ability and willingness of EU institutions and Member State‘s 
governments to resolve effectively the current debt crisis.  
 
Euro failure is not an option 
For pessimists, it is only a question of time before the Eurozone unravels, one way or the 
other. For optimists, however, Eurozone failure is not an option, because it would actually 
not solve the Member States‘ fiscal and economic predicament. It would just make things 
worse, both in the short and long term. Moreover, it would risk undermining the entire 
European integration project and the political and economic benefits that have accrued from 
it. 
 
For Eurozone countries like Greece or Portugal that are experiencing a severe fiscal crisis, 
abandoning the euro in order to reintroduce the national currency is not the solution. The 
economic and social consequences would be even worse than those caused by the current 
austerity measures. Reintroducing the national currency would lead to a sharp devaluation   12 
of the exchange rate, which would be the sole reason for giving up the European currency. 
Devaluation  would  restore  some  degree  of  competitiveness  for  exports,  which  in  turn 
would help fuel economic growth.
10 However, it would also lead to a massive flight of 
capital outside the country, as holders of financial assets try to salvage the value of their 
wealth before the devaluation. This would seriously limit investment in the economy, 
because the national savings base would no longer be available to provide financing while 
any form of foreign borrowing would have become impossible as a result of debt defaults. 
 
The  reintroduction  of  a  much  devalued  national  currency  would  lead  to  an  upward 
explosion in the value of public and private debts, since the latter are denominated in EUR. 
With incomes generated in the national currency, it would then become impossible for the 
government and individuals to repay their debts in euros. Thus, massive public and private 
defaults  would  have  to  take  place,  which  would  bring  down  the  domestic  financial 
system.
11 With a collapsed financial system and a government that is no longer able to 
borrow, at home or abroad, the economy would suffer not a recession but a depression. 
Because credit would become pretty much inexistent, it would become very difficult for 
firms and households to go about their business. Firms would no longer be able to borrow 
to buy inputs for production, let alone invest in plants, machinery and equipment. As such, 
many of them would collapse, leaving their workers unemployed. For those households 
whose breadwinners would still be fortunate enough to have a job, they would have to 
                                                 
10 Eichengreen (2007) points out that such an outcome depends on how workers and other economic agents 
react to the devaluation. If, for example, workers manage to negotiate higher wages to compensate for their 
loss of purchasing power as a result of the devaluation, then there may be little or no gain in competitiveness. 
11 In fact, there would be a run on the banks with any expectation that the national currency would be 
reintroduced as depositors would want to withdraw their high-valued euros before they are turned into 
devalued drachmas or pesetas (Blejer and Levy-Yeyati, 2010; Eichengreen, 2010).   13 
postpone any purchase of housing and durable goods until they had saved up the money. 
This would put an additional damper on consumption. Finally, government spending would 
also  have  to  fall  drastically  as  tax  revenues  would  collapse  and  borrowing  would  be 
unavailable. Public sector workers would also lose their jobs and social programmes would 
have to be cut. The only option for the government to sustain some kind of spending would 
be to force the central bank to buy government bonds with newly printed money; if this 
were done to an extent whereby the government tried to keep spending at current levels, 
then inflation would rise significantly and economic growth would be hurt as a result.  
 
It is also worth mentioning that reintroducing the national currency is fraught with technical 
difficulties  (Eichengreen,  2007;  2010).  It  could  not  be  done  overnight  without  severe 
disruptions to basic economic activities. After all, it took three years after the creation of 
the euro in 1999 to introduce notes and coins. The introduction of a national currency in a 
developed  economy  would  require  long  and  detailed  planning  since  computers  and 
software would have to be reprogrammed, payment and vending machines modified, notes 
and coins designed, produced and distributed, etc. So one can only imagine how disruptive 
for individuals and firms an unplanned reintroduction of the national currency would be. 
Economic growth would be negatively affected. Moreover, social unrest would likely break 
out if people could not pay for anything with their bank cards or access cash. 
 
So any positive effect that the reintroduction of the national currency would have on net 
exports would be more than nullified by a sharp decline in consumption, investment and 
government spending. Furthermore, the absence of credit in the economy would probably   14 
also  make  export transactions  very difficult to  conclude  as  firms  would be unlikely to 
secure  the  necessary  financing  for  producing  the  goods  and  services  while  awaiting 
payment  from  customers.  Hence,  abandoning  the  euro  and  reintroducing  the  national 
currency would lead to a massive economic shock that would be much worse than any 
adjustment  programme  accompanying  the  EU/IMF  bailouts.  In  addition,  the  negative 
economic  effects  of  abandoning  the  euro  would  be  immediate  while  adjustment 
programmes are spread over several years.  
 
If a country like Greece or Portugal decided to abandon the Eurozone, it would also likely 
have to give up its membership of the EU. This is because the euro is an intrinsic part of the 
EU and there is no legal means to withdraw from the euro without also withdrawing from 
the EU (Athanassiou, 2009). Such a scenario would amount to a post hoc renegotiation of 
the Member State‘s accession to the EU, which would be hard to manage politically.
 12 In 
addition, withdrawal from the euro would mean the imposition of strict restrictions on the 
movement of capital in order to prevent massive capital flight, as mentioned above.
13 This 
would also require that the movement of people in and out of the country be restricted, in 
order to prevent people from taking suitcases full of cash out of  the country (Eichengreen 
2007).  Controlling capital movements these ways would contravene other key elements of 
                                                 
12 Other than Denmark and the United Kingdom, which negotiated legal opt-outs when the Maastricht Treaty 
was agreed to in the early 1990s, all the other EU Member States are legally bound to adopt the euro once 
they have satisfied the Maastricht criteria for admission. The EU Treaty does not allow Member States to opt 
unilaterally out of certain clauses or legal commitments. The only option would be to negotiate an official 
opting out agreement with the other EU members, which the existing Eurozone Member States would most 
probably not accept as there would little interest in negotiating any membership adjustment for a Member 
State that wished to abandon the euro and inflict severe economic casualties on its EU partners. 
13 This is what Argentina had to do when it abandoned its currency board in 2002 (Blejer and Levy-Yeyati, 
2010).   15 
the EU‘s acquis communautaire, two of the four freedoms that underpin the single market: 
free movement of capital and labour Under such circumstances, it becomes difficult to see 
how a country could remain a member of the EU while contravening several of its legal 
obligations.  Therefore,  in  addition  to  the  economic  implications  of  reintroducing  the 
national currency, a country would find that its free access to its largest export market may 
no longer available. Surely, this would severely undermine any benefit to exports that a 
devaluation of the exchange rate could possibly provide. It would also hurt investment by 
domestic and foreign firms, which would further affect the economy‘s future prospects. 
Again, it appears that working out debt problems from within the Eurozone and the EU is a 
better (or less bad) solution than abandoning the euro and reintroducing national currencies. 
 
So far we have examined why it would not be in the interest of a Member State suffering a 
severe debt crisis to abandon the euro and reintroduce the national currency. However, 
what if Germany and others decided that they were no longer willing to support those 
Eurozone partners experiencing debt crises because, for example, it would take them too 
long to implement the required fiscal and structural reforms? Again, the costs would be 
substantially larger than the benefits. To begin with, it would entail an immediate loss for 
Eurozone  governments,  the  EFSF,  the  ECB  as  well  as  private  banks  and  financial 
institutions  that  hold  Greek,  Irish  and  Portuguese  sovereign  bonds.  Given  that  these 
countries are currently unable to finance their public debt on financial markets, the removal 
of bailout money from the EU would cause their governments to immediately default on 
their debt. Given that, at the end of 2010, the outstanding sovereign debt of these three 
countries was about 560 billion EUR (Standard and Poor‘s, 2011, p.17), even a partial   16 
default  would  represent  a  substantial  loss  for  European  public  and  private  investors, 
including the German government and German banks. Furthermore, a default in Greece, 
Ireland and Portugal would immediately have a contagious effect on Italy and Spain, whose 
combined sovereign debt at the end of 2010 was 2,113 billion EUR (ibid.). Already in the 
summer of 2011, yields on Italian and Spanish sovereign bonds were reaching levels that 
many  considered  close  to  unsustainable,  thereby  forcing  the  Italian  and  Spanish 
governments to adopt new austerity measures to rapidly reduce their fiscal deficits and, 
hopefully, reassure investors that default was out of the question. Should Italy and Spain be 
forced to default, it would be catastrophic for the EU and its financial system.  
 
According to the European Banking Authority‘s stress test exercise in the spring of 2011, 
European banks held about one third of the sovereign debt of Greece, Ireland and Portugal 
as  of  2010  (European  Banking  Authority,  2011,  p,28).  The  total  exposure  of  Belgian, 
German, French and Dutch banks to the debt of public and private institutions in the PIIGS 
was  on  average  over  120  per  cent  of  the  home  country‘s  banking  system  capital  and 
reserves in the fall of 2010 (TD Economics, 2011, p.5). This means that a complete default 
of public and private debt in the these countries would bankrupt the banks in Belgium, 
Germany, France and the Netherlands, unless their governments intervened to recapitalise 
(that  is,  bail  out)  them.  Although  a  complete  default  by  the  PIIGS  is  highly  unlikely 
(scenarios plan for a 30 or 50 per cent ‗haircut‘), this amount of exposure by the banks in 
the  EU‘s  key  debt-backer  countries  would  cause  significant  disruptions  in  the  proper 
functioning of  financial  markets  and force  governments  whose  finances  are themselves 
already strained to intervene to keep the system going.   17 
 
But the costs of giving up the provision of financial assistance to the Euro-Med countries 
and possibly Ireland would be more than just the loss on the value of holdings of sovereign 
bonds  and  the  bailout  of  the  financial  sector  in  the  so-called  ‗core‘  Eurozone  around 
Germany. It would undoubtedly lead to the break-up of the Eurozone (and also likely the 
EU) itself, with the euro probably remaining the common currency of the core countries. 
Such a scenario would hurt the medium- and long-term prospects of the core economies. 
First, they would see the relative value of the euro appreciate significantly (Posen 2011; 
Wolf 2010), which would hurt their exports not only to the Euro-Med countries but also to 
the rest of the world. One just needs to take a look at what has been happening to the Swiss 
Franc during the crisis; for example, in the year or so that followed Greece‘s first bailout, in 
May 2010, the Swiss Franc gained close to 15 per cent on the euro and 30 per cent on the 
US dollar. With the break-up of the Eurozone, in addition to bringing back exchange rate 
risk, the core countries would lose the other benefits associated with a common currency in 
their  economic  exchanges  with  the  Euro-Med  countries  and  Ireland  (Posen  2011).  For 
instance, Baldwin et al. (2008) calculate that, in aggregate, the euro has increased trade by 
5% during the 1999-2006 period, over and above other factors such as the single market. 
They also conclude that the euro had a positive effect on foreign direct investments. For 
their  part,  Barrell  et  al.  (2008,  p.52)  find  that  the  ‗common  currency  has  had  a  direct 
positive impact on growth in the core Euro Area countries‘.
14 They estimate that the euro 
will end up increasing economic output by approximately 2 per cent in these core countries. 
 
                                                 
14 The authors‘ analysis includes Italy as part of the Euro Area core countries.   18 
Second, should the Eurozone break-up also lead the Euro-Med countries to leave the EU, 
then Germany and company would lose their ‗free‘ access to these markets, which would 
further hurt exports, a significant portion of these countries‘ GDP. The contribution to EU-
wide  GDP  by  the  single  or  internal  market  is  not  insignificant.  Ilzkovitz  et  al.  (2007) 
estimate that the single market increased overall EU GDP by 2.2% and total employment 
by 1.4% during the 1999-2006 period. They also claim that these gains could be doubled if 
the remaining market barriers were eliminated. Hence, removing a substantial portion of the 
EU‘s single market by jettisoning the PIIGS would also cost the Eurozone core countries as 
it would further lower their GDP and employment. 
 
If it is economically (and socially) costly for the PIIGS to abandon the Eurozone and for the 
core countries to abandon the PIIGS, there is an added benefit of keeping the Eurozone 
together and continuing with the bailouts and other means to support economically troubled 
countries.  It  is  a unique chance for  countries  like Greece,  Italy, Portugal  and Spain  to 
undertake  long  overdue  fiscal  and/or  structural  reforms.
15  Otherwise, with default, the 
countries  will  be  back  where  they  started,  without  any  real  improvements  to  their 
microeconomic and fiscal structures. Argentina is a case in point. Growth may have 
restarted quickly after its default but that is mainly because of rising commodity prices in 
international markets (Cavallo 2011). Otherwise, the underlying structure of the Argentine 
economy  and  the  government‘s  macroeconomic  policies  do  not  seem  to  have  changed 
much. For instance, inflation is now running at 10% officially, although private surveys 
                                                 
15 Once again, the case of Ireland is different since its fiscal crisis is solely due to its bailout of the Irish 
banking system. Just before its financial meltdown, Ireland had a low level of debt to GDP and its economy 
was deemed to be competitive.    19 
indicate that the true rate of inflation is more around 20-25% (Economist Intelligence Unit, 
2011). Moreover, producer prices are increasing at an even faster rate than consumer prices, 
which is likely to hurt the competitiveness of exports in the medium and long term. In 
terms of fiscal policy, the government is forecast to run a fiscal deficit in 2011, in spite of 
the economy being expected to grow at an astonishing rate of 8.5% (ibid.). This is because 
government spending is growing at a faster rate than the economy. Surprisingly perhaps, 
there  has  also  been  a  large  amount  of  capital  flight  away  from  Argentina  since  2006, 
indicating a certain lack of confidence in the long term prospects of the economy (ibid.). It 
is also noteworthy that the IMF‘s Executive Board issued a statement on 13 July 2011 
indicating that there were concerns with the quality of Argentina‘s statistics for inflation 
and GDP.  
 
Such  behaviour  by  the  Argentine  government  may  look  similar  to  that  of  Greek 
governments after the country joined the Eurozone in 2001: they lied about the true state of 
the country‘s  public finances.  In fact,  as  already  mentioned, many Euro-Med countries 
relaxed the pace of fiscal and structural adjustments to their economies once they joined the 
Eurozone. Thanks to much lower interest rates on debt, it became easier to finance budget 
deficits  and  sustain  higher  levels  of  debt,  which  fuelled  consumption  and  investment, 
especially in real estate (in Spain, for example). There is thus a strong chance that once 
outside the Eurozone, Euro-Med countries would go back to their old ways of maintaining 
export  competitiveness  and  growth  by  devaluing  their  national  currency  and  refraining 
from adopting difficult reforms that would make their economies more productive. With 
the  current  adjustment  programmes  under  the  various  bailout  initiatives  as  well  as  the   20 
newly improved EU institutional mechanisms for monitoring and enforcing sounder fiscal 
policies, these countries stand a much better chance of coming out of the current debt crisis 
with stronger, more competitive economies than if they let go of the euro or are abandoned 
by their Eurozone partners.
16 For sure, the adjustment will not be easy. However, taking the 
so-called  ‗easy‘  way  out  will  only  result  in  even  more  short-term  pain  while  actually 
undermining future growth prospects for all those involved, the PIIGS and the Eurozone 
core countries. The solution to the debt crisis is therefore not less but more Europe. 
 
Conclusion 
It should be clear by now that, in spite of the fact that the Eurozone is still not an optimal 
currency area, the solution to the euro‘s present difficulties is not to abandon it, one way or 
another. Since the beginning of the global financial crisis, which transformed itself into a 
debt crisis, EU leaders and institutions have shown that they understand this crucial point. 
The approach has been characterised as ‗muddling through‘ rather than ‗decisive‘ but, as 
Mario Telò (forthcoming) reminds us, the EU tries very hard to strike a ‗relatively stable 
balance between efficiency and legitimacy‘. Crisis management in the EU may look messy, 
given its structure and the nature of its institutions, but it nevertheless ends up getting the 
job done (Kirkegaard 2010; 2011). And as the EU has gotten the job done in the context of 
the financial and fiscal crises, it has become gradually more integrated (see also Grossman 
and  Leblond,  2011).  Effective  cooperation,  coordination  and  burden-sharing,  whether 
regional  or  global,  still  remain  a  better  way  to  deal  with  cross-border  problems.
                                                 
16 For an assessment of the adjustment programmes for Greece, Ireland and Portugal, see Leblond (2011).   21 
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